Will Choice of Corporate Law Become Trivial?

BALANCING OF INTERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG, Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne, Richard Freer, Wolfgang Lüke, Wolfgang Weitnauer, eds., Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, 2005

Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-05

12 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2005  

William J. Carney

Emory University School of Law

Abstract

American corporate law scholarship has witnessed the waxing and waning of a variety of grand theories about the globalization of corporate law in the past two decades. The first idea was that harmonization of European company law might lead to a productive form of uniformity. The second was that American law was out of step with that of other leading industrialized nations, and perhaps we should look to their models, generally involving controlling shareholders, for guidance. The third idea was that investors and corporations face common problems regardless of local law, and in a competitive environment one might expect a convergence of corporate laws through market forces that sought the most efficient solutions to these common problems. This kind of convergence has only occurred at a few margins, and seems unlikely to occur in such a way that choice of law rules in corporate law would become less relevant. Indeed, the fourth wave of scholarship in this field now seeks to explain why significant differences persist.

Keywords: Corporate law, conflict of laws, convergence of laws

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Carney, William J., Will Choice of Corporate Law Become Trivial?. BALANCING OF INTERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG, Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne, Richard Freer, Wolfgang Lüke, Wolfgang Weitnauer, eds., Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, 2005; Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=870496

William J. Carney (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-6807 (Phone)
404-727-6820 (Fax)

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