Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education

St. Gallen Economics Discussion Paper No. 2005-22

CESifo Working Paper No. 1628

32 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2005

See all articles by Justina A. V. Fischer

Justina A. V. Fischer

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD); Stockholm School of Economics; University of Hohenheim

Date Written: December 7, 2005

Abstract

Identification of a deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance by studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of the exact transmission channels for this impact. Studies for the U.S. that find an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes support the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. However, research for Switzerland using a time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and class size detects no such effect. These findings are in line with previous analyses that identify efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland.

Keywords: Direct Democracy, Median Voter, Bureaucracy, Public Education

JEL Classification: H72, H41, I22

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Justina A.V., Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education (December 7, 2005). ; CESifo Working Paper No. 1628. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=871081

Justina A.V. Fischer (Contact Author)

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

Stockholm School of Economics

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

University of Hohenheim

Fruwirthstr. 48
Stuttgart, 70599
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
123
Abstract Views
1,193
rank
230,732
PlumX Metrics