Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education
St. Gallen Economics Discussion Paper No. 2005-22
32 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2005
Date Written: December 7, 2005
Identification of a deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance by studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of the exact transmission channels for this impact. Studies for the U.S. that find an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes support the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. However, research for Switzerland using a time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and class size detects no such effect. These findings are in line with previous analyses that identify efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland.
Keywords: Direct Democracy, Median Voter, Bureaucracy, Public Education
JEL Classification: H72, H41, I22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation