Duopolistic Competition, Taxes and the Arm's-Length Principle

22 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2005  

Evelyn Korn

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Stephan Lengsfeld

University of Freiburg

Date Written: December 20, 2005

Abstract

Numerous (high-tax) countries presume that multinational firms use their transfer-pricing policies to shift profits into countries with lower tax rates. To avoid the corresponding loss in tax revenues, tax authorities develop constantly tightening rules which limit the scope of transfer-price distortions. Affected firms include the decision of compliance to these rules into their strategic considerations. Within a game-theoretic model we show that firms' transfer-pricing policies are driven by three issues: interaction with competitors, minimization of tax burden, and avoidance of punishments. It shows that tighter transfer-pricing rules may help firms to defuse competition and to increase their profits and that non-compliance to the arm's length principle is part of their equilibrium strategy.

Keywords: transfer pricing, arm's-length principle, taxes, regulation, duopolistic competition

JEL Classification: H25, L22, M40, M43, M46, M47

Suggested Citation

Korn, Evelyn and Lengsfeld, Stephan, Duopolistic Competition, Taxes and the Arm's-Length Principle (December 20, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=871219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.871219

Evelyn Korn

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Universitätsstr. 24
D-35037 Marburg
Germany
++49 6421 2823902 (Phone)
++49 6421 2828944 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/mikro

Stephan Lengsfeld (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg

Bertoldstr. 17, Alte Uni
Freiburg i. Br., D-79085
Germany

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