Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

IILJ Working Paper No. 2005/17

43 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2005

See all articles by James E. Salzman

James E. Salzman

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management; University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

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Date Written: 2005

Abstract

From Introductory Paragraph: When one thinks of international organizations whose administrative processes legal scholars should understand, the European Union and the World Trade Organization come to mind without a moment's hesitation. A bit later, perhaps, one might also come up with the Montreal Protocol secretariat, Codex Alimentarius, or the International Organization for Standardization. It will probably take a good while before the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comes to mind. In some respects this is hardly surprising, for the OECD is neither a well-known nor well-studied international organization (and is certainly not known as a lawmaking institution). Located in Paris and best known for its research reports, the OECD has a "secret life" that goes well beyond that of policy analysis. Indeed, a number of its activities influence domestic agency action far more than is generally realized.

JEL Classification: K29

Suggested Citation

Salzman, James E., Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005). IILJ Working Paper No. 2005/17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=871757 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.871757

James E. Salzman (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management ( email )

4670 Physical Sciences North
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-5131
United States

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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