A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants

Posted: 28 Dec 2005

See all articles by Anthony Ogus

Anthony Ogus

University of Manchester - School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules but which nevertheless, in many instances, falls short of unification across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal integration. We argue that countries hesitate to adapt their laws to those of another jurisdiction because they hope to free ride on efforts towards convergence. Unification (by transplant) and harmonization (by convention) of legal rules emerge as an obvious corrective intervention to a coordination failure, thus solving the free-riding problem. However, it could also be a serious policy mistake either because convergence is absent due to very high costs of importing and adjustment or due to agency costs.

Keywords: Legal transplant, game theory, convergence, harmonization, unification, agency costs

JEL Classification: C7, K0

Suggested Citation

Ogus, Anthony I. and Garoupa, Nuno, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=871932

Anthony I. Ogus (Contact Author)

University of Manchester - School of Law ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/staff/anthony_ogus/default.html

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 -10-408-1585 (Phone)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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