Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multi-Market Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 1997

Posted: 9 Jul 1997

See all articles by Philip M. Parker

Philip M. Parker

INSEAD

Lars-Hendrik Röller

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change

Abstract

The deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition. One example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the United States where the FCC created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets. Taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment, we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes. We find that cross-ownership and multi-market contact are important factors in explaining non-competitive prices.

JEL Classification: L13, L40, L96

Suggested Citation

Parker, Philip M. and Röller, Lars-Hendrik, Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multi-Market Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=8726

Philip M. Parker

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
Fontainebleau, 77305
France
(33) (0)1 60 72 40 00 (Phone)
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Lars-Hendrik Röller (Contact Author)

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/eng/faculty-research/lars-hendrik-roeller/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2549 1440 (Phone)
+49 30 2549 1442 (Fax)

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