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Incentives and Tournaments in Public Organizations

32 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2006  

Andrew B. Whitford

University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

This essay discusses an integrative economic theory that reconciles rank-order tournaments with the traditional public administration concern for accountability in government. Recent reforms have concentrated on organizational designs that flow from piece-rate approaches to employee compensation and have ignored the incentive-compatibility aspects of traditional personnel systems. My claim is that promotion tournaments in public organization hierarchies are perhaps more efficient than the pay-for-performance systems often called for in traditional principal-agent approaches.

Keywords: Agency theory, public organizations, pay for performance, organizational design

JEL Classification: D73, M52

Suggested Citation

Whitford, Andrew B., Incentives and Tournaments in Public Organizations (January 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=873488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.873488

Andrew B. Whitford (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy ( email )

Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-542-2898 (Phone)
706-583-0610 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://andrewwhitford.com

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