International Cooperation, Coalitions Stability and Free Riding in a Game of Pollution Control

18 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2006

See all articles by Michèle Breton

Michèle Breton

HEC Montreal - Department of Management Sciences

Karima Fredj

University of Northern British Columbia - Faculty of Arts

Georges Zaccour

HEC Montreal - Department of Decision Sciences

Abstract

We consider a set of countries that wish to sign an international agreement to control pollution. The problem is studied from the perspective of cooperative games and three possible definitions of the characteristic function of the game are analyzed. We further address the issue of free riding and the stability of coalitions. The challenge is to find a possible reconciliation of the two approaches. In other words, we are looking for a payment function which ensures the formation and stability of a large coalition, even if we consider that different countries are playing non-cooperatively and are acting only in their own interest. Our results suggest that it is difficult to deter free riding and that no large coalition can emerge if countries decide to play non-cooperatively.

Suggested Citation

Breton, Michèle and Fredj, Karima and Zaccour, Georges, International Cooperation, Coalitions Stability and Free Riding in a Game of Pollution Control. Manchester School, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 103-122, January 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=873924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00485.x

Michèle Breton (Contact Author)

HEC Montreal - Department of Management Sciences ( email )

Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada
514-340-6490 (Phone)
514-340-5634 (Fax)

Karima Fredj

University of Northern British Columbia - Faculty of Arts ( email )

Georges Zaccour

HEC Montreal - Department of Decision Sciences ( email )

HEC Montreal
3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H2X 2L3 H3T 2A7
Canada

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