Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Chris William Sanchirico

Chris William Sanchirico

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

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Abstract

This paper studies the problem of how the legal system regulates activity outside the courtroom based on information supplied in court by interested and potentially dishonest parties. The supply of information is analyzed along a game-theoretic dimension: the extent to which the supplier has an interest in how the information will be used. Such analysis uncovers a basic trade-off in system design between the 'fixed costs' of hearings (e.g., the productive activity forsaken by participation) and the cost of the evidence produced therein. This trade-off helps to explain and connect several trends in the historical evolution of English civil process.

Suggested Citation

Sanchirico, Chris William, Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 342-380, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=874174

Chris William Sanchirico (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

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215-898-4220 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csanchir/

University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

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Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

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