Measuring the Effects of Post-Government-Employment Restrictions

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Rafael Gely

Rafael Gely

University of Missouri School of Law

Asghar Zardkoohi

Texas A&M University - Department of Management

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Abstract

The revolving door problem linking private interests and government decision makers has become an important mechanism in the implementation of influence peddling. The revolving door problem is premised on the assumption that a market exists for the services of former government employees. However, no attempt has been made to provide a measure of the value of these services, nor to evaluate the effect of regulations intended to curb the problem. This article attempts to fill this gap by utilizing an event-study methodology to measure the effect of gaining access to government under alternative regulations.

Suggested Citation

Gely, Rafael and Zardkoohi, Asghar, Measuring the Effects of Post-Government-Employment Restrictions. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 288-301, 2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=874187

Rafael Gely (Contact Author)

University of Missouri School of Law ( email )

Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO MO 65211
United States

Asghar Zardkoohi

Texas A&M University - Department of Management ( email )

430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
919-845-2043 (Phone)
919-845-9641 (Fax)

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