Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Daniel M. Klerman

Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement when the government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seeking government seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The article concludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth, a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizing government in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parking violations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes; (2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and never worse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choice between competitive private enforcement and public enforcement depends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M. and Garoupa, Nuno, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 116-140, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=874197

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=227

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
913
PlumX Metrics