Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Kevin E. Davis

Kevin E. Davis

New York University School of Law

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Abstract

This article explains why states in which bribe payers are located (payor states) criminalize transnational bribery. It suggests that these initiatives can enable selfinterested payor states to improve the terms upon which their nationals obtain the services of foreign public officials. Although the legislation in question is not patently designed to further economic interests, it may be only partially enforced in a manner consistent with the economic interests of payor states. This implies that further attention should be devoted to analyzing how anti-bribery legislation is enforced.

Suggested Citation

Davis, Kevin E., Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 314-340, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=874204

Kevin E. Davis (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Vanderbilt Hall, Room 335
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8843 (Phone)

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