International Tax Competition, Tax Cooperation and Capital Controls
University of Aarhus Dept. of Econ. WP 1997-9
26 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 1997
Date Written: 1997
Abstract
Tax competition between independent authorities is known to lead to inefficient outcomes, implying there is scope for cooperation. In an international framework where the authorities are national governments, the undesirable features of tax competition may alternatively be mitigated by imposing restrictions on international capital flows. Using a two-country model it is shown that capital controls may fully remedy the adverse effects of tax competition and thereby render tax cooperation superfluous. In more general cases, however, capital controls have some undesirable side-effects, leaving room for cooperative actions. Moreover, the mere option of imposing capital controls may promote the implementation of tax cooperation.
JEL Classification: J41, H22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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