The Byrd Amendment as Facilitating a Tacit International Business Collusion

21 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2006

See all articles by Yoshitomo Ogawa

Yoshitomo Ogawa

Kinki University

Yoshiyasu Ono

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

We analyze the effect of the Byrd Amendment, which amended the US Tariff Act of 1930 to allow revenue from antidumping duties to be distributed to domestic import-competing firms. In an international duopoly framework it is shown that it urges the home firm to restrict output so that the foreign firm increases output and that revenue from the duties increases. Consequently, not only the home firm but also the foreign firm can be better off while only consumers are worse off. Home total surplus increases if the foreign rival firm is much more efficient, but otherwise decreases.

Keywords: Byrd Amendment, Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), Antidumping duty, Tariff-revenue distribution

JEL Classification: F12, F13

Suggested Citation

Ogawa, Yoshitomo and Ono, Yoshiyasu, The Byrd Amendment as Facilitating a Tacit International Business Collusion (January 2006). ISER Discussion Paper No. 647. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.875168

Yoshitomo Ogawa (Contact Author)

Kinki University ( email )

Higashi-Osaka City, Osaka 577-8502
Japan

Yoshiyasu Ono

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

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