9 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2006
An extensive empirical literature suggests that mandates passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm performance and thereby benefit investors as Congress intended. This suggests that the mandates should be rescinded or at least made voluntary. More broadly, these analyses caution that legislating in the immediate aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firm performance, SOA
JEL Classification: G3, G38, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Romano, Roberta, Quack Corporate Governance. Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 36-44, Winter 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875370