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Quack Corporate Governance

9 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2006  

Roberta Romano

Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

An extensive empirical literature suggests that mandates passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm performance and thereby benefit investors as Congress intended. This suggests that the mandates should be rescinded or at least made voluntary. More broadly, these analyses caution that legislating in the immediate aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firm performance, SOA

JEL Classification: G3, G38, G34

Suggested Citation

Romano, Roberta, Quack Corporate Governance. Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 36-44, Winter 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875370

Roberta Romano (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4965 (Phone)
203-432-4871 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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