Quack Corporate Governance

Romano, Roberta

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Quack Corporate Governance

Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 36-44, Winter 2005

9 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2006

See all articles by Roberta Romano

Roberta Romano

Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

An extensive empirical literature suggests that mandates passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm performance and thereby benefit investors as Congress intended. This suggests that the mandates should be rescinded or at least made voluntary. More broadly, these analyses caution that legislating in the immediate aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firm performance, SOA

JEL Classification: G3, G38, G34

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Romano, Roberta, Quack Corporate Governance. Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 36-44, Winter 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875370