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Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties

49 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2006  

Mara Faccio

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

David C. Parsley

Vanderbilt University - Finance

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

Many firms voluntarily incur the costs of attempting to influence politicians. However, estimates of the value of political connections have been made in only a few extreme cases. We propose a new approach to valuing political ties that builds on these previous studies. We consider connected to a politician all companies headquartered in the politician's home town, and use an event study approach to value these ties at their unexpected termination. Analysis of a large number of sudden deaths from around the world since 1973 reveals a market adjusted 1.7% decline in the value of geographically connected companies. The decline in value is followed by a drop in the rate of growth in sales and access to credit. Our results additionally show a larger effect for family firms, firms with high growth prospects, firms operating in industries over which the politician has jurisdiction, and firms headquartered in highly corrupt countries.

Keywords: political ties, political connections

JEL Classification: G3, G28

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara and Parsley, David C., Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties (February 2007). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 113/2006; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.875808

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

David C. Parsley

Vanderbilt University - Finance ( email )

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0649 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

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