Citations (8)



Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?

Thomas J. Dohmen

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC)

December 2005

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1905

High rewards or the threat of severe punishment do not only provide incentives to exert high levels of effort but also create pressure. Such pressure can cause paradoxical performance effects, namely performance decrements despite strong incentives and high motivation. By analyzing the performance of professional football players on a well-defined task, namely to score on a penalty kick, the paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of such detrimental incentive effects. Two pressure variables are considered in particular: (1) the importance of success and (2) the presence of spectators. There are plenty of situations in which pressure arises in the workplace. Knowing how individuals perform under pressure conditions is crucial for labor economists because it has implications for the design of the workplace and the design of incentive schemes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: choking under pressure, paradoxical performance effects of incentives,

JEL Classification: M54, Z13

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Date posted: January 20, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Dohmen, Thomas J., Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure? (December 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1905. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=876443

Contact Information

Thomas Dohmen (Contact Author)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072

Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC) ( email )
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
+31-43-388 3832 (Phone)
+31-43-388 4856 (Fax)
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