Information in Mechanism Design
43 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2006
There are 3 versions of this paper
Information in Mechanism Design
Information in Mechanism Design
Information in Mechanism Design
Date Written: January 2006
Abstract
We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.
Note: A previous version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=788728
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex Post Equilibrium, Robust Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Information Management
JEL Classification: C79, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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