Political Repression and Child Labour: Theory and Empirical Evidence

29 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2006

See all articles by Alessandro Maffei

Alessandro Maffei

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Nikolai Raabe

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Heinrich W. Ursprung

University of Konstanz; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

Most normative studies on child labour arrive at the conclusion that child labour is detrimental to social welfare. Child labour is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries even though in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a political-economic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labour legislation. The most important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimes enforcement is more lenient and child labour thus more prevalent than in countries enjoying political freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data.

Suggested Citation

Maffei, Alessandro and Raabe, Nikolai and Ursprung, Heinrich, Political Repression and Child Labour: Theory and Empirical Evidence. The World Economy, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 211-239, February 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=877131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00778.x

Alessandro Maffei (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany
0 75 31 88-37 63 (Phone)
0 75 31 88-21 45 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de

Nikolai Raabe

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

Heinrich Ursprung

University of Konstanz ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany
+49 7531 88 3713 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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