Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

22 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2006

See all articles by Oguzhan C. Dincer

Oguzhan C. Dincer

Illinois State University - Department of Economics; Illinois State University-Institute for Corruption Studies

Christopher J. Ellis

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Glen R. Waddell

University of Oregon - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

Keywords: Corruption, decentralization, yardstick competition, spatial autoregression

JEL Classification: H20, H29

Suggested Citation

Dincer, Oguzhan C. and Ellis, Christopher J. and Waddell, Glen R., Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition (June 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=877470 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.877470

Oguzhan C. Dincer

Illinois State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Illinois State University-Institute for Corruption Studies ( email )

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States

Glen R. Waddell

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-1259 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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