Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=877481
 
 

References (46)



 
 

Citations (12)



 


 



Inequality and Media Capture


Maria Petrova


Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats - ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); New Economic School (NES)

January 11, 2007


Abstract:     
People's support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects. Mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion, even when voters understand that the media can be biased. I develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost. The model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom; this effect is stronger in democratic regimes. I find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross-country models.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: inequality, redistribution, mass media, taxation, public goods

JEL Classification: D31, D72, H41


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Date posted: January 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Petrova, Maria, Inequality and Media Capture (January 11, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=877481 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.877481

Contact Information

Maria Petrova (Contact Author)
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats - ICREA ( email )
Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
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