On the Relation between Organisational Practices and New Technologies: The Role of (Time-Based) Competition

27 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Philippe Askenazy

Philippe Askenazy

IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Paris School of Economics (PSE)

David Thesmar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Mathias Thoenig

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics

Abstract

This article studies some aspects of organisation choice while explicitly accounting for the fact that firms compete on the product market. Firms compete by introducing drastic innovations, while organisation choice results from a tradeoff between productive efficiency and reactivity. We show that the adoption of information technologies and the choice of reactive organisations are complements via an industry-level equilibrium effect. This view contrasts with the existing literature which emphasises the existence of similar complementarities at the firm level. Consistently with our model, we find that industry-level, rather than firm-level, diffusion of information technologies explains firms' organisational practices.

Suggested Citation

Askenazy, Philippe and Thesmar, David and Thoenig, Mathias, On the Relation between Organisational Practices and New Technologies: The Role of (Time-Based) Competition. Economic Journal, Vol. 116, No. 508, pp. 128-154, January 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=878191 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01050.x

Philippe Askenazy (Contact Author)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

David Thesmar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States
16172259767 (Phone)

Mathias Thoenig

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4313 6380 (Phone)
+33 1 4313 6382 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )

40 boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 379 8274 (Phone)
+41 22 379 8293 (Fax)

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