Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence

17 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2006

See all articles by M. Daniele Paserman

M. Daniele Paserman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

David A. Jaeger

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

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Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with the ruling political party, Fatah, and subsequent Palestinian fatalities. We do not find a similar relationship for Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian factions. We conjecture that these differences are due to the different positions of the factions vis-à-vis bargaining over a two-state solution to the conflict as well as the organizational structures of the factions.

Keywords: Intifada, terrorism, conflict resolution, bargaining, violence

JEL Classification: C32, D71, D74, H56

Suggested Citation

Paserman, M. Daniele and Jaeger, David A., Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence (January 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1923, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=878326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.878326

M. Daniele Paserman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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David A. Jaeger (Contact Author)

University of St. Andrews - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

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