Horizontal Merger Antitrust Enforcement: Some Historical Perspectives, Some Current Observations

15 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2006

See all articles by Lawrence J. White

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

The DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines were developed for and best deal with horizontal mergers where the theory of harm is coordinated effects. The Guidelines deal awkwardly, at best, with mergers where the theory of harm is unilateral effects. The broad body of evidence - from profitability studies, from pricing studies, and from auction studies - indicates that seller concentration matters. But these studies do not provide adequate guidance as to whether current antitrust enforcement is too strict or too lenient with respect to mergers. Research on the consequences of the close call mergers that were not challenged might well provide such guidance, as might a meta analysis of the extant price-concentration studies. New procedures are needed for inquiry and enforcement where the theory of harm is unilateral effects, as is a market definition paradigm for monopolization cases.

Keywords: Antitrust, Merger Enforcement, Merger Guidelines, Coordinated Effects, Unilateral Effects

JEL Classification: K21, L41

Suggested Citation

White, Lawrence J., Horizontal Merger Antitrust Enforcement: Some Historical Perspectives, Some Current Observations (March 2006). NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=878452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.878452

Lawrence J. White (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
328
Abstract Views
2,077
rank
70,527
PlumX Metrics