Taxes and Tradable Permits as Instruments for Controlling Pollution Theory and Practice

50 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2006

See all articles by John Norregaard

John Norregaard

Formerly with International Monetary Fund (IMF); Independent

Valérie Reppelin-Hill

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department

Date Written: January 2000

Abstract

This paper examines the relative merits of two dominant economic instruments for reducing pollution-'green' taxes and tradable permits. Theoretically, the two instruments share many similarities, and on balance, neither seems preferable to the other. In practice, however, most countries have relied more on taxes than on permits to control pollution. The analysis suggests a number of lessons to be learned from country experiences regarding the design and implementation of both instruments. While many, particularly European countries, currently have long-term programs involving environmental taxes, a willingness to experiment with tradable permits seems to be growing, especially given the Kyoto protocol emission targets.

Keywords: Environmental taxes, tradable permits

JEL Classification: H20, Q00

Suggested Citation

Norregaard, John and Norregaard, John and Reppelin-Hill, Valérie, Taxes and Tradable Permits as Instruments for Controlling Pollution Theory and Practice (January 2000). IMF Working Paper No. 00/13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879337

John Norregaard (Contact Author)

Formerly with International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Independent ( email )

Valérie Reppelin-Hill

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department ( email )

700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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