An Interest Rate Defense of a Fixed Exchange Rate?

19 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2006

See all articles by Robert P. Flood

Robert P. Flood

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; CENTRUM Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Olivier Jeanne

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: October 2000

Abstract

Defending a government's exchange-rate commitment with active interest rate policy is not an option in the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of speculative attacks. In that model, the interest rate is the passive reflection of currency-depreciation expectations. In this paper we show how to adapt the KFG model to allow for an interest rate defense. It is shown that increasing the domestic-currency interest rate makes domestic assets more attractive according to an asset substitution effect, but weakens the domestic currency by increasing the government's fiscal liabilities. As a result, raising the interest rate hastens the speculative attack when speculation is motivated by underlying fiscal fragility.

Keywords: Speculative attack, fixed exchange rate regime, fiscal policy

JEL Classification: F32, F33

Suggested Citation

Flood, Robert P. and Jeanne, Olivier, An Interest Rate Defense of a Fixed Exchange Rate? (October 2000). IMF Working Paper No. 00/159, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879988

Robert P. Flood (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7667 (Phone)
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CENTRUM Business School

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Peru

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Olivier Jeanne

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Room 10-548L
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-4272 (Phone)
202-623-6334 (Fax)

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees (ENPC) ( email )

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75007 Paris
France
+33 1 44 58 28 76 (Phone)
+33 1 44 58 28 80 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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