'Unfair' Discrimination in Two-Sided Peering? Evidence from Linx

26 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2006

See all articles by Alessio D'Ignazio

Alessio D'Ignazio

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics

Emanuele Giovannetti

Anglia Ruskin University - Institute for International Management Practice, LAIBS

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the "fairness" of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX).

Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in "market size" enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in "network centrality" induces quality degradation, hence "unfairer" interconnection conditions.

Keywords: Internet Peering, Two-sided Markets, Network Industries, Antitrust

JEL Classification: L14, L86, L96, C81, L40

Suggested Citation

D'Ignazio, Alessio and Giovannetti, Emanuele, 'Unfair' Discrimination in Two-Sided Peering? Evidence from Linx (January 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=880077 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.880077

Alessio D'Ignazio (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics and Politics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

Emanuele Giovannetti

Anglia Ruskin University - Institute for International Management Practice, LAIBS ( email )

East Road
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire CB1 1PT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://anglia.ac.uk/ruskin/en/home/faculties/aibs/staff_profiles/all_staff/emanuele_giovannetti.html

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