The Effect of State Laws on Capital Structure
Posted: 15 Feb 2006
We examine the impact of state laws on capital structure for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. Firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less debt, while antitakeover statutes do not significantly reduce long-run leverage. Correcting for the endogenously determined choice of where to incorporate, we find that firms sort themselves according to state laws and capital structure needs. After accounting for self-selection, state antitakeover laws are positively associated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to lower market values for these firms. State laws on payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not reincorporated outside their home states. Accounting for these constraints appears to explain part of the negative relationship between profitability and leverage.
Keywords: Leverage, State Laws, Profitability
JEL Classification: G32, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation