Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

56 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2006

See all articles by Caroline Van Rijckeghem

Caroline Van Rijckeghem

Istanbul Analytics

Beatrice Weder

University of Mainz - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1997

Abstract

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57

Suggested Citation

Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? (June 1997). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-56, 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=882353

Caroline Van Rijckeghem (Contact Author)

Istanbul Analytics ( email )

Istanbul
Turkey

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

University of Mainz - Department of Economics ( email )

Chair of Corporate Finance
D-55099 Mainz, 55128
Germany
+49 613 1392 0144 (Phone)
+49 613 1392 5053 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,418
rank
12,295
Abstract Views
5,198
PlumX Metrics