Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

56 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2006

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1997

Abstract

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57

Suggested Citation

Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? (June 1997). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-56, 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=882353

Caroline Van Rijckeghem (Contact Author)

Istanbul Analytics ( email )

Istanbul
Turkey

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

Graduate Institute Geneva, IHEID ( email )

Geneva Avenue de la Paix 11A
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland
1211 (Fax)

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