On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games

FEUNL Working Paper No. 465

24 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2006

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all > 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.

Suggested Citation

Carmona, Guilherme, On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). FEUNL Working Paper No. 465, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=882466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.882466

Guilherme Carmona (Contact Author)

New University of Lisbon ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal

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