On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games
FEUNL Working Paper No. 465
24 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2006
Date Written: 2004
Abstract
We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all > 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Carmona, Guilherme, On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). FEUNL Working Paper No. 465, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=882466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.882466
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