Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets

46 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2006 Last revised: 2 Jul 2009

See all articles by Nicolae Garleanu

Nicolae Garleanu

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Darrell Duffie

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lasse Heje Pedersen

AQR Capital Management, LLC; Copenhagen Business School - Department of Finance; New York University (NYU); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand are larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then "recover" over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.

Suggested Citation

Garleanu, Nicolae Bogdan and Duffie, James Darrell and Pedersen, Lasse Heje, Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets (February 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12020. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=883070

Nicolae Bogdan Garleanu

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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James Darrell Duffie (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Lasse Heje Pedersen

AQR Capital Management, LLC ( email )

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Copenhagen Business School - Department of Finance ( email )

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Denmark

New York University (NYU) ( email )

Stern School of Business
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New York, NY 10012-1126
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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