Restraining Yourself: Fiscal Rules and Stabilization

24 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2006

See all articles by Tamim Bayoumi

Tamim Bayoumi

International Monetary Fund (IMF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Barry Eichengreen

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 1994

Abstract

State budgets in the United States played a significant macroeconomic role in the 1970s and 1980s, and the level of cyclical responsiveness was affected by the severity of statutory and constitutional fiscal restraints. Moving from no fiscal restraints to the most stringent restraints lowered the fiscal offset to income fluctuations by around 40 percent. Simulations indicate that a reduction in aggregate fiscal stabilizers of this size could lead to a significant increase in the variance of aggregate output.

Keywords: Fiscal stabilization, fiscal restraints

JEL Classification: E62, H61, H74

Suggested Citation

Bayoumi, Tamim and Eichengreen, Barry, Restraining Yourself: Fiscal Rules and Stabilization (July 1994). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-24, 1994. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=883808

Tamim Bayoumi (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-6333 (Phone)
202-623-4795 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Barry Eichengreen

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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