Enterprise-State Relations after Mass Privatization: Their Character in Mongolia

MOCST-MOST ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES

Posted: 16 May 1998

See all articles by James H. Anderson

James H. Anderson

World Bank - Governance Global Practice

Georges Korsun

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu - Financial Advisory Services

Peter Murrell

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Abstract

Mass privatization is the centerpiece of policies aiming to sever the old links between state and enterprise and to channel interactions into modern legal and regulatory forms. Thus, enterprise-state relations are an important indicator of the effect of mass privatization. We present a detailed picture of those relations for Mongolia, which has implemented a comprehensive voucher-privatization scheme. The state interacts with enterprises in multifarious ways, many inconsistent with the role of the removed regulator that is the objective of reforms. We find that intensity of interaction is strongly related to the size of state ownership. Indeed, our results suggest the incipient creation of two different privatized sectors, one in which there is partial state ownership, which accounts for a large proportion of enterprise-state interactions, and one in which there has been complete privatization, with enterprises far removed from the state.

JEL Classification: P11, P21, H11

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James Horton and Korsun, Georges and Murrell, Peter, Enterprise-State Relations after Mass Privatization: Their Character in Mongolia. MOCST-MOST ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=88449

James Horton Anderson

World Bank - Governance Global Practice ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN J 4-403
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-1556 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://blogs.worldbank.org/team/jim-anderson

Georges Korsun

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu - Financial Advisory Services ( email )

2 World Financial Center
New York, NY 10281
United States
212-436-5981 (Phone)
212-653-3776 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.deloitte.com/us/economics-statistics

Peter Murrell (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3476 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
695
PlumX Metrics