International Coordination of Economic Policies: Scope, Methods, and Effects

59 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2006

See all articles by Jacob A. Frenkel

Jacob A. Frenkel

Merrill Lynch & Co. - Sovereign Advisory Group and Global Financial Institutions Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul R. Masson

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; The Brookings Institution

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 29, 1988

Abstract

This paper discusses the scope, methods, and effects of international coordination of economic policies. In analyzing the scope for and of coordination, the paper addresses the rationale for coordination, barriers to coordination, the range and specificivity of policies to be coordinated, and the frequency of coordination. In evaluating the methods of coordination, the emphasis is on the broad issues of rules versus discretion, single-indicator versus multi-indicator systems, and hegemonic versus symmetric systems. Finally, using the MULTIMOD global macroeconomic model, some simulations are presented of several rule-based proposals for coordination.

JEL Classification: 430

Suggested Citation

Frenkel, Jacob A. and Masson, Paul R., International Coordination of Economic Policies: Scope, Methods, and Effects (June 29, 1988). IMF Working Paper No. 88/53, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=884836

Jacob A. Frenkel (Contact Author)

Merrill Lynch & Co. - Sovereign Advisory Group and Global Financial Institutions Group

New York, NY
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paul R. Masson

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

The Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
202-797-6278 (Phone)
202-797-2968 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
77
Abstract Views
1,028
rank
329,567
PlumX Metrics