Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies

24 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2006

See all articles by A. Lans Bovenberg

A. Lans Bovenberg

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Jeroen Kremers

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Paul R. Masson

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; The Brookings Institution

Date Written: July 1990

Abstract

This paper reviews the pros and cons of institutionalized constraints limiting the freedom of national budgetary policies within an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. The issue is approached from three angles: the influence of EMU on (i) budget discipline; (ii) intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency; and (iii) macroeconomic stabilization. The desirability of constraints on budgetary policy is related to the arrangements for EMU-wide monetary policy, the credibility of a no-bailout clause among member states, and progress in the area of supply-side policies.

JEL Classification: 321, 431, 432

Suggested Citation

Bovenberg, A. Lans and Kremers, Jeroen and Masson, Paul R., Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies (July 1990). IMF Working Paper No. 90/60, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=884881

A. Lans Bovenberg (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Jeroen Kremers

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Paul R. Masson

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

The Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
202-797-6278 (Phone)
202-797-2968 (Fax)

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