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A Mechanism for Allocating Objects in a Network of Symmetric Caches

6 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2006  

Mohit Tawarmalani

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Karthik Natarajan Kannan

Purdue University

Prabuddha De

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze object allocation in a network of caches that share web content to exploit network externality benefits. The analysis is presented for both centralized and decentralized scenarios, and is carried out using operations research and game-theoretic tools. The optimal allocation is found for each case, and cache incentives are aligned with the socially optimal welfare by devising appropriate pricing mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

Tawarmalani, Mohit and Kannan, Karthik Natarajan and De, Prabuddha, A Mechanism for Allocating Objects in a Network of Symmetric Caches. 15th Annual Workshop on Information Technolgies & Systems (WITS) Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=885925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.885925

Mohit Tawarmalani

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Karthik Natarajan Kannan (Contact Author)

Purdue University ( email )

Krannert School of Management
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

Prabuddha De

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

403 West State Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056
United States
765-494-0699 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/directory/bio.asp?username=pde

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