Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?

5 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2006  

Michel Kerf

World Bank - Infrastructure Department

Isabel Neto

World Bank

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

Among the countries that have fully liberalized their telecommunications sector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules often (but not always) applied by sector-specific institutions, while others have focused mainly on economy-wide antitrust rules and institutions to control market power in that sector. This note describes the choices made in that respect by Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the UK and the US. It then attempts to draw lessons from the experiences of those countries on whether antitrust or sector-specific processes appear to deal with key regulatory issues most quickly and effectively. A second note will discuss the same question in more details focusing specifically on the regulation of interconnection. Finally, a third note will discuss whether choosing the "right" balance between antitrust and sector-specific regulation appears to translate into a higher degree of competitiveness in the various segments of the telecommunications market.

Keywords: telecommunications, antitrust, competition law, regulation, interconnection, Australia, United Kingdon, United States, New Zealand, Chile, dominance

JEL Classification: L12, L22, L41, L43, L50, L96, D42, K21

Suggested Citation

Kerf, Michel and Neto, Isabel and Geradin, Damien, Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best? (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886292

Michel Kerf (Contact Author)

World Bank - Infrastructure Department ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

Isabel Neto

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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