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Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: A Close Look at Interconnection

6 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2006  

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University College London - Faculty of Laws

Isabel Neto

World Bank

Michel Kerf

World Bank - Infrastructure Department

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

In a companion note (Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?), we argued that while the full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying to a large extent on general antitrust rules and institutions as instruments of economic regulation, some sector-specific rules and specialized implementing institutions are still likely to be needed - at least for some time after liberalization - in a number of areas, including interconnection. In the present note, we look in more details at the regulation of interconnection drawing from the experience of New Zealand which fully liberalized its telecommunications markets in the late 1980's and relied primarily on antitrust instruments to regulate interconnection until 2001 when it introduced a new regime with heavier emphasis on sector-specific regulation.

Keywords: telecommunications, antitrust, interconnection, regulation, competition law, access pricing, New Zealand, LRIC, ECPR, Internet, broadband

JEL Classification: L12, L22, L41, L43, L50, L96, D42, K21

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Neto, Isabel and Kerf, Michel, Antitrust vs. Sector Specific Regulation in Telecom: A Close Look at Interconnection (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886305

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Isabel Neto

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Michel Kerf

World Bank - Infrastructure Department ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

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