Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships

26 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Jennifer Gandhi

Jennifer Gandhi

Emory University - Department of Political Science

Adam Przeworski

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Abstract

Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.

Suggested Citation

Gandhi, Jennifer and Przeworski, Adam, Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships. Economics & Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-26, March 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x

Jennifer Gandhi (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727- 1935 (Phone)
404-727-4586 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty%20pages/gandhi.htm

Adam Przeworski

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States
(212) 998-3707 (Phone)
(212) 995-4184 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/przeworski/przeworski_home.html

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
18
Abstract Views
2,461
PlumX Metrics