How Did the 2003 Prescription Drug Re-Importation Bill Pass the House?

19 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Omer Gokcekus

Omer Gokcekus

Seton Hall University - School of Diplomacy and International Relations

Mike Adams

Independent

Henry G. Grabowski

Duke University - Department of Economics

Edward Tower

Duke University - Department of Economics; Chulalongkorn University-Economics Department

Abstract

We examine the major interest groups in the debate over allowing the re-importation of prescription drugs by utilizing a logit model and instrumental variables. Consistent with political support approach, the evidence suggests that Representatives are maximizing their electoral prospects: contributions from pharmaceutical manufacturers shrink the probability of voting for the bill; and Representatives are sensitive to their constituencies - employees of pharmaceutical manufacturing and senior citizens. Representatives' gender and ideology regarding free trade and subsidies are also determining factors. However, the decision was, by and large, a partisan one: party affiliation was the most important factor in passing the bill.

Suggested Citation

Gokcekus, Omer and Adams, Mike and Grabowski, Henry G. and Tower, Edward, How Did the 2003 Prescription Drug Re-Importation Bill Pass the House?. Economics & Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 27-45, March 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00161.x

Omer Gokcekus (Contact Author)

Seton Hall University - School of Diplomacy and International Relations ( email )

South Orange, NJ 07079
United States
973-313-6272 (Phone)
973-275-2519 (Fax)

Mike Adams

Independent

No Address Available

Henry G. Grabowski

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1839 (Phone)

Edward Tower

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1818 (Phone)
919-684-8974 (Fax)

Chulalongkorn University-Economics Department

Bangkok
Thailand

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