Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion?

41 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2006

See all articles by Mary Amiti

Mary Amiti

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Trade Unit; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

John Romalis

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

This paper assesses the effects of reducing tariffs under the Doha Round on market access for developing countries. It shows that for many developing countries, actual preferential access is less generous than it appears because of low product coverage or complex rules of origin. Thus lowering tariffs under the multilateral system is likely to lead to a net increase in market access for many developing countries, with gains in market access offsetting losses from preference erosion. Furthermore, comparing various tariff-cutting proposals, the research shows that the largest gains in market access are generated by higher tariff cuts in agriculture.

Keywords: Preference erosion, market access, tariffs, trade preferences

JEL Classification: F13, F14, F15

Suggested Citation

Amiti, Mary and Romalis, John, Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion? (January 2006). IMF Working Paper No. 06/10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888155

Mary Amiti (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Trade Unit ( email )

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Washington, DC 20431
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University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

John Romalis

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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