Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying

23 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2006

See all articles by Felix Várdy

Felix Várdy

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of vote-buying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.

Keywords: Vote buying, lobbying, corruption, elections

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Várdy, Felix and Morgan, John, Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying (January 2006). IMF Working Paper, Vol. , pp. 1-23, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888156

Felix Várdy

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

John Morgan (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/

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