House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization

36 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2006 Last revised: 16 Oct 2008

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 13, 2006

Abstract

We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. In addition to the rooms already occupied by the existing tenants, there are vacated rooms by the graduating class. Students have strict preferences over dormitory rooms. Each student shall be assigned a dormitory room in an environment where monetary transfers are not allowed. An existing tenant can move to another room as a result of the assignment. We show that you request my house-I get your turn mechanisms introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (Journal of Economic Theory, 1999) are the only mechanisms that are Paretoefficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral, and consistent.

Keywords: House allocation, matching, strategy-proofness, consistency, individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, neutrality

JEL Classification: C78, D70, D78

Suggested Citation

Sonmez, Tayfun and Ünver, M. Utku, House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization (February 13, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888639 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.888639

Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Utku Unver (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

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