A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

59 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2006

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

We propose that a simple 'dual-self' model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. Finally, the reduced form of the base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axions.

Note: A previous version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=617522

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. and Levine, David K., A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (March 2006). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2112, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888752 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.888752

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David K. Levine

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