Learning and Belief Based Trade

12 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2006

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Date Written: March 2006

Abstract

We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K., Learning and Belief Based Trade (March 2006). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2113. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=888762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.888762

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

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David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

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50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

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