Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism

35 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2006

See all articles by Anton Suvorov

Anton Suvorov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Jeroen van de Ven

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: March 9, 2006

Abstract

This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. We show that the principal, when she obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. Consistent with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance imperfectly, i.e., she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent's effort provided that the principal's stake in the project is small. Our analysis further reveals that, also in accordance with the empirical findings, the principal may ex ante prefer to choose a smoky, rather than a fully transparent performance monitoring system, thereby acquiring an implicit commitment device to reward the agent through discretionary bonuses.

Keywords: discretionary rewards, feedback, self confidence, subjective performance, moral hazard, monitoring system

Suggested Citation

Suvorov, Anton and van de Ven, Jeroen, Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism (March 9, 2006). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics 2006-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=889280

Anton Suvorov

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Shabolovka 26
Moscow, 119049
Russia

Jeroen Van de Ven (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
134
Abstract Views
1,101
rank
211,265
PlumX Metrics