Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls

27 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2006 Last revised: 27 Oct 2008

See all articles by Guillaume R. Frechette

Guillaume R. Frechette

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College, Department of Economics

Date Written: March 1, 2006

Abstract

Many markets have "unraveled" and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. It has previously proved difficult, however, to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to 1992, college football teams were matched for post-season play up to several weeks before the end of the regular season. Since 1992, the market has reorganized to postpone this matching. We show that the matching of teams affects efficiency as measured by the resulting television viewership, and that the reorganization promoted more efficient matching, chiefly as a result of the increased ability of later matching to produce "championship" games.

Keywords: Two-Sided Matching, Unraveling, Assortative Matching, Efficiency, College Football

Suggested Citation

Frechette, Guillaume R. and Roth, Alvin E. and Unver, Utku, Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls (March 1, 2006). Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 890461. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=890461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890461

Guillaume R. Frechette

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

19 West Fourth St., 6th floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://files.nyu.edu/gf35/public/html/econ.htm

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Utku Unver (Contact Author)

Boston College, Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
6175640771 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

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