State Monopoly in Higher Education as a Rent Seeking Industry

14 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2006

See all articles by Michael S. Mitsopoulos

Michael S. Mitsopoulos

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises

Theodore Pelagidis

University of Piraeus; Brookings Institution

Date Written: March 2006


In Greece, the provision of tertiary education is permitted, by the constitution, only to "public" institutions where faculty and administrators are civil servants and public officials respectively. We construct an argument and present statistical data that describe the situation observed in Greece, where the community of higher education providers decides in the name of the whole society on the extent to which the provision of these services is a (state) monopoly. We see that in the context of our argument the society has to override the decision of the educational community regarding the provision of these services if it desires to see the community of educational services providers to allocate more time towards their profession and less time towards rent protection and/or extraction. We argue that once reform, that is the removal of the state monopoly, is introduced the educational community will allocate more effort towards educational related activities and less effort towards rent protection while at the same time it will accept a new "equilibrium" in which education related activities are rewarded more generously.

Keywords: Higher Education, Policy Reforms, Rent Seeking, Greece

JEL Classification: I22, I28, K00

Suggested Citation

Mitsopoulos, Michael S. and Pelagidis, Theodore, State Monopoly in Higher Education as a Rent Seeking Industry (March 2006). Available at SSRN: or

Michael S. Mitsopoulos (Contact Author)

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises ( email )

Xenofontos str 5
Athens, 10557
2106722694 (Phone)

Theodore Pelagidis

University of Piraeus ( email )

21 Lambraki street
Piraeus, Attiki 18533
+3021 04142526 (Phone)
+3021 4142571 (Fax)


Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States


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