Alternatives for Going Public: Evidence from Reverse Takeovers, Self-Underwritten Ipos, and Traditional Ipos

45 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2006

See all articles by Kimberly C. Gleason

Kimberly C. Gleason

American University of Sharjah

Ravi Jain

National University of Singapore

Leonard Rosenthal

Bentley University - Department of Finance

Date Written: March 15, 2006

Abstract

We examine the characteristics of firms using reverse takeovers and self-underwritten IPOs as an alternative to the traditional underwritten IPO. We find that at the time they go public, firms that use alternative mechanisms tend to be less profitable than contemporaneously issued IPO firms of comparable size in the same 3 digit SIC code, but they do not exhibit significantly higher distress. However, by two years post going public, they have significantly increased debt and experience declines in profitability and balance sheet liquidity. Furthermore, we find that RT and SU firms are characterized by lower levels of trading liquidity and significantly higher volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of returns. While the combined sample of RT and SU firms have comparable institutional ownership post going public to their control IPO firms, RT firms are characterized by significant lower institutional ownership than their matches, and while IPO firms experience significant increases in institutional support, those using RTs and SUs experience declines. We also find evidence that firms utilizing alternative going public mechanisms outperform their matched traditional IPO counterparts in the short term, and exhibit comparable performance in the three years following going public as indicated by equal-weighted buy and hold returns.

Keywords: IPO, Reverse Merger, going public

JEL Classification: G19, G34

Suggested Citation

Gleason, Kimberly C. and Jain, Ravi and Rosenthal, Leonard, Alternatives for Going Public: Evidence from Reverse Takeovers, Self-Underwritten Ipos, and Traditional Ipos (March 15, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=890714 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890714

Kimberly C. Gleason (Contact Author)

American University of Sharjah ( email )

P.O. Box 26666
Sharjah
United Arab Emirates

Ravi Jain

National University of Singapore ( email )

1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

Leonard Rosenthal

Bentley University - Department of Finance ( email )

175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02154
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,592
Abstract Views
10,388
Rank
22,846
PlumX Metrics